The Janus of Yeŋiçeri: Analysis of The Ambivalence of Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward Israel

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Abstract
This article aims to explain the ambivalence of Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel during President Erdoğan's leadership in 2014 – 2018. The problem that arises is: Why does Turkey implement a foreign policy that is ambivalent towards Israel? This article uses the theoretical basis of neoclassical realism and groupthink to solve the problem. The method used in this research is explanatory-qualitative with interviews. The findings in this research showed that the ambivalence in Turkish foreign policy towards Israel during President Erdoğan's leadership (2014 – 2018) was influenced by aspects of systemic international politics and local political dynamics as well as Neo-Ottoman views in the formulation of their national interests.

Keywords: bilateral, cooperation; groupthink, interest, neo-ottoman

Introduction
Foreign policy is one of the interesting topics in the realm of International Relations. Foreign policy is the embodiment of a country's set of visions and goals in achieving its national interests in the international political arena. Foreign policy is the goal (which includes the national interests to be aimed at), the path (in
this case, the strategies and methods to achieve national interests), and the means (the use of national power) that are important in a country's interactions with other countries (Bojang, 2018). Foreign policy cannot be explained through one general theory of IR, and systemic analysis is required to explain a country's decisions through its foreign policy (Lobell et al., 2009). Turkey has an ambivalent foreign policy, which drives the urgency for research to be carried out.

The ambivalence of Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel means that Turkey has bilateral policies that may seem contradictory. Turkey stands for Islamic politics in the Middle East through Neo-Ottoman-based thought, and yet Turkey still maintains its bilateral relationship with Israel despite the many turbulences. For example, Turkey criticized Islamic countries for collaborating and normalizing relations with Israel. In this case, it is the United Arab Emirates. Turkey considers the normalization of relations carried out by Arab countries as a form of hypocrisy regarding collective interests in the Palestinian struggle (The Jakarta Post, 2020). However, Turkey has actually become one of Israel's largest trading partners in the Middle East (World Bank, 2021). Reconciliation of diplomatic relations was carried out on economic and military grounds (Amidror, 2016). Turkey has had a pattern of ambivalence in its foreign policy towards Israel through the reign of previous Presidents. However, the ambivalence became more contrasted during the reign of President Erdoğan. President Erdoğan is a person who is sensitive to politics and is involved in politics based on Islamic principles (Baykal, 2009).

This ambivalence continues into contemporary times. Historical evidence can be seen from the flow of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, in which Turkey was sympathetic towards the Palestinian side before the Cast Lead operation and the Mavi Marmara ship incident by Israel (Cohen, 2013). The ambivalence and structure of the problems that occurred were unique, and the pattern continues to this day. This ambivalence and uniqueness are the reasons for choosing this foreign policy research topic. Andi Iswan Ilyas has carried out previous research on the ambivalence of Turkish Foreign Policy from Hasanuddin University entitled “Ambivalensi Kebijakan Luar Negeri Turki Di Bawah Kepemimpinan Erdoğan Terhadap Israel.” This research is literature that the author feels is quite close to the research that the author will carry out. Both use Neo-Ottoman views as a determinant of internal views on foreign policy. However, the theoretical framework used in the literature is different from what the author would use. The author emphasizes detail in discussing the ambivalence and pragmatism of Turkey's policy towards Israel using the views of neoclassical realism and groupthink.

While almost similar literature uses a definition of the concept of foreign cooperation that borrows slightly from the view of classical realism and the idiosyncratic aspects of President Erdoğan, the author provides a contrasting distinction with different points of view. The research on the ambivalence of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Israel often underlooks the possibility of aspects other than those commonly used as an analysis tool. The problem arises whenever the ambivalence of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Israel becomes inconsistent and shows the traits of hypocrisy. This research hypothesizes that the ambivalence of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Israel is caused by interactions between external (geopolitical) factors and domestic political dynamics. The purpose of this research is to explain the reasons behind the implementation of Turkey's ambivalent foreign policy towards Israel during President Erdogan's 2014 – 2018 term.

Theoretical Framework and Research Method

This research utilizes two theories to explain the problem. The first theory used is the theory of neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism is a theory on the basis of the appropriate use of an analysis tool for foreign policy decision-making. Unlike other branches of realism theory, neoclassical realism is a theory aimed at explaining a country's foreign policy (Rosyidin, 2020). Neoclassical realism focuses on complex state behavior, especially in the areas of policy-making and decision-making, and sometimes
cannot be explained solely by classical realism or neorealism (Rathbun, 2008).

![Mind Map of Neoclassical Realism](image1)

*Figure 1.1 Mind Map of Neoclassical Realism.*

*Source: Prepared by Author*

Groupthink is the second and complementary theory in this research. Groupthink is a theory and perspective regarding bureaucracy and policy-making patterns. This theory argues that group cohesion and solidarity play a role in the formulation of policy, including foreign policy (Janis, 1972). Groupthink has a strong element of collectivity between individuals. Groupthink emphasizes group harmony, but it does not always lead to good decision outcomes (Aldag & Fuller, 2004). In fact, the phenomenon of groupthink in organizations can make the goals longer to be achieved or even not achieved at all (Golkar, 2013). It can also be said that ambivalence can have its roots here.

![Groupthink Structure](image2)

*Figure 1.2 Groupthink Structure.*

*Source: Prepared by Author*

In this, the author uses interview methods and a literature study. The interview method is the method the author uses to obtain primary data. The interview was conducted with Mr. Muhammad Sya'roni Rofii, S.H.I., M.A., and Ph.D. from the School of Strategic and Global Studies, University of Indonesia. Mr. Muhammad Sya'roni Rofii, S.H.I., M.A., Ph.D., is one of the experts in Middle Eastern studies that the author can contact and provides very representative data. The author also uses library research through the use of journals that are relevant to the topic the author uses.

**Result and explanation**

Neoclassical realism combines systemic analysis of external factors (third image) with domestic analysis (second image) in explaining a country's foreign policy. Each has a premise based on a view of political realism. Third-image factors include the anarchic structure of the international system, full of competition between countries in fulfilling their national interests, incentives, and obstacles to a country's foreign policy originating from outside that country (Lobell et al., 2009). In research regarding Turkey's foreign policy ambivalence towards Israel during President Erdoğan's leadership in 2014 – 2018, external factors had a fairly strong role in shaping President Erdoğan's foreign policy perceptions. Over time, President Erdoğan wants Turkey to become a key player in regional geopolitics and act by carrying out rapprochement actions with its neighboring countries, especially those that can maximize its national interests (Taspinar, 2018).

The realists agreed that the nature of the international structure with the dichotomy of 'anarchy' has become a consensus for realist thinkers in International Relations. This situation provides incentives for countries to determine strategic steps that will be taken to deal with potential threats and changes in the map of power in an efficient way, generally with a Balance of Power (Grieco, 1988). Turkey faces anarchy in its regional geopolitics in the Middle East. Regional geopolitics is an external factor. Even though the scale is small, regional geopolitical units have strong links to the domestic politics of the countries involved (Lobell et al., 2009). The concept is still similar to realism. It is important to look at the regional geopolitical situation faced by the AK Party and Turkey in formulating its foreign policy, especially towards Israel.
Arab Spring and The Status Quo

The first external factor that shapes Turkey’s ambivalent foreign policy towards Israel is The Arab Spring. Anarchy in the structure of the International System had a significant impact on the Arab Spring phenomenon in 2011. This phenomenon was political upheaval in Middle Eastern countries, especially Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco, which saw the success of Erdoğan (who at that time was still serving as Prime Minister) in transforming Islamic values in secular politics (Murinson, 2012). The Arab Spring has indeed become a milestone in the success of Türkiye's active foreign policy role. Neighboring countries see Turkey's achievements through its foreign policy and see that Islamic political values can be in harmony with national interests and the rules of the international political game. Arab Spring resulted in changes in the regional state regime and gave the incentive for more power struggle (Rofii, 2023, Online Interview). In the end, the stability of the political situation is an ideal situation for fulfilling national interests (Murinson, 2012). Regime change and the emergence of political instability in a wide scope in an anarchic structure made Turkey think about the strategic steps that must be taken.

During the Arab Spring, Erdoğan had strong control over Turkey’s foreign policy, which was an extension of his domestic politics. His perspective influenced how other dominant actors behaved towards Turkey in the Arab Spring phenomenon (Kuru, 2015)—the Arab Spring period encouraged Erdoğan to be pragmatic about changes in the geopolitical situation around him. One thing that can be seen clearly is the position of Turkey and the European Union in responding to this changing geopolitical situation. Both Turkey and the European Union are showing a defensive posture in maintaining the status quo (Tocci et al., 2011). Turkey is also practicing pragmatism with other actors considered important in the Arab Spring, especially actors who can provide guarantees of stable relations.

Turkey and Israel have different strategies for responding to the Arab Spring. The defensive posture built by Israel is seen first, while Turkey plays a more active role in maximizing the achievement of its national interests. However, Israel understands that Turkey also has problems and issues that arise as a result of this political instability. Israel has a strong interest in the security sector after the Arab Spring revolution. Israel is building a defensive posture due to the absence of strategic alliances under this anarchy system. Its relations with Turkey are still at a low point after the Mavi Marmara incident, and Israel cannot see Turkey's goals and interests. (Panayiotides, 2012). Nevertheless, the situation of anarchy has provided an opportunity for Israel to reconsider its antagonism towards Turkey after the Mavi Marmara incident.

Turkey needs strong alliances in the Middle East region, especially with countries that have good relations with Western countries as strong actors in international politics. Erdoğan needs a guarantor actor, a party who can act as a bandwagon for his country's national interests. Turkey and Israel do not have many options other than to continue to strengthen existing security cooperation and not exacerbate the deterioration in bilateral relations (Lindenstrauss, 2012). Turkey and Israel also have positive relations with Azerbaijan in the security and energy sectors at this time (Daniel, 2022). Historical factors play a role through NATO membership, which helps Turkey respond to significant changes in the political situation with a defensive posture and continue to prioritize national security by maintaining good military cooperative relations with Israel, the only Western defense partner in the region (Volfová, 2014).

Based on analysis, it can be said that the phenomenon of the Arab Spring political upheaval in an anarchic system brought Turkey and Israel together at the crossroads of their national interests. If this condition is viewed through the lens of neoclassical realism, the ecosystem in an anarchic system that is self-help provides a strong incentive for Turkey and Israel to continue to work together and maintain good relations in the security sector (Lobell et al., 2009). Even though Turkey feels that its national interests have a fairly good path in the “Turkish Model,” which is widely known as a promoter of democracy and socio-economic progress, as
the country's leader, Erdoğan still cannot be sure whether regional political instability can still provide benefits to Turkey's national interests in the long, future period (Kuru, 2015).

The geopolitical region of the Middle East has a favorable atmosphere for describing the concept of the struggle for power from a realist perspective, including neoclassical realism, where many countries are trying to become regional hegemons and change the current status quo (Panayiotides, 2012). Middle East region has a pattern of multipolarism, and there is no single hegemonic power that regulates the distribution of material power and the status quo. There are around five countries that are the main powers in the Middle East region apart from Turkey, namely Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. and Israel (Lindenstrauss, 2018). Socio-political changes have not suspended the status of the five countries as local hegemons, and each has ways to maximize its national interests, including Turkey.

Turkey and Iran both aim to become the strongest regional power through aspirations of Islamic identity. In the period before and after the Arab Spring, these two countries viewed each other with suspicion and strategies to overcome potential power/influence (Jenkins, 2012). First, about identity politics in the Middle East region after the Arab Spring, Turkey is suspected of supporting the religion-based movement carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood organization. Second, Turkey is skeptical, although not hostile, towards Iran's development of nuclear energy. Turkey defends Iran's right to use nuclear energy. However, Turkey understands that nuclear development will create interest in other countries in the Middle East to do the same and trigger nuclear proliferation (Gürzel & Ersoy, 2012). Third, Iran's support for Bashar Al-Assad in the civil war taking place in Syria. Turkey does not like this, considering that many of Erdoğan's speeches criticized the Al-Assad regime in aspects of its politics and government (Kuru, 2015). Fourth, there is concern from Turkey regarding the security sector due to the development of Iranian weapons and its connection to the existence of Kurdish ethnic separatists on Turkey's eastern border. As far as can be understood, both have strong political goals and seek to change the existing balance of power (Lindenstrauss, 2018).

The presence of Iran's power in the Syrian issue and the potential for developing weapons and nuclear energy gives Turkey worry (Kadorrah, 2020). When Iran heated up a bit with Saudi Arabia in 2015, Erdoğan gave a statement showing the nature of balancing towards Iran through an approach with Saudi Arabia (Altunsık, 2020; Başkan, 2019). However, changes in the geopolitical situation provide changes to a country's behavior, especially in balancing attitudes towards regional powers, and a country will look for the most efficient way to deal with a potential threat without sacrificing its national interests (Lobell et al., 2009). Turkey is making efforts to seize the status quo and prevent other countries from changing it. Israel sees Iran as a rising power and threatening the status quo through possible proxies (Guzansky & Dekel, 2015). Turkey sees Iran as not as antagonistic as Israel but still sees Iran's growing power as something that needs to be anticipated in the Middle East region. The similarity in security corridors regarding Iran is one of the factors that makes Turkey maintain its strategic relations with Israel.

In the end, Turkey maintained its security relations with Israel. Israel has a strong sense of urgency for security and, through the assistance of the United States, seeks to negotiate with countries that conduct military trade with Iran, especially Russia, to prevent potential disruption of national security (Aftandilian, 2018). Balancing security between Turkey and Israel is easier to do because these two countries have aligned national security interests. Security has become a converging interest for Ankara and Tel Aviv (Aygun, 2016). The security urgency is aimed at contaminating the potential threat of the Syrian civil war and ISIS and other Islamic paramilitary organizations for Israel as well as violent acts of terrorism in the Southern Turkey region for Turkey (Bekdil, 2018; Lindenstrauss & Gulen, 2018).

Kurdish Insurgency

For Turkey, the Kurdish Insurgency played an essential role in the realm of national
security—the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) in 1978. The Kurdish community is widely spread in the southern region of Turkey, especially on the borders with Syria and Iraq. They are an ethnic minority who receive different and unfair treatment from the Turkish government and have different political views from Turkey (Bilgin & Sarihan, 2013). This ethnic Kurdistan movement is aimed at establishing an independent political entity in the Southern Turkey region and increasing the political role of Kurdish people in Turkish domestic politics (Joseph, 2006).

Due to armed insurgency and the threat it poses to Turkey's national security, it can be understood that the Kurdish insurgency is Turkey's main concern (Rofii, 2023, Online Interview). The insurgency of Kurdish is a problem that Turkey considers critical, a security problem that is at hand and must be resolved. This situation is multidimensional because the Kurdish ethnic movement can divide Türkiye in various aspects. The AKP Party and Erdoğan have tried several times to negotiate peace with the Kurdish political elite, but to date, this has not produced maximum results.

The Kurdish ethnic insurgency, when viewed through the structure of the geopolitical system, is a threat at the sub-system level that affects Turkey's relations with surrounding countries. The Kurdish resistance movement under the auspices of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is considered a threat to security and unity in Turkey. Turkey grants the status of “terrorist” and “armed rebellion” to organizations related to all actions and movements of Kurds, based on the acts of resistance and violence carried out by these organizations, showing Turkey's seriousness in viewing the Kurdish movement as a threat security that comes from within the country itself (Middle East Eye, 2016). Viewed from a diachronic perspective, Turkey and the Kurdish ethnic group do not have a harmonious relationship (Bekdil, 2017). This threat of insurgency became a major security priority during the leadership of Erdoğan and the AKP Party (Ibid). The AKP party is faced with difficult choices when the power base of the insurgency is not only within the country. The PKK Party inspector general received special asylum in Syria, Turkey's closest neighbor in the south (Gurpinar, 2020). The spread of intelligence forces also reached northern Iraq, bordering Turkey, giving a transnational dimension to the Kurdish ethnic problem facing Turkey.

The component of the threat in question is political power. In general, the AKP Party elite still sees the ethnic Kurdish power bases on Turkey's southern border as a threat. The absence of a major power to mediate means there is no guarantee that Turkey will get help if the ethnic Kurdish insurgency (in Syria and Iraq) increases. Shiite expansion by Iran becomes intense. From a domestic aspect, there are differences between the Neo-Ottomans and the Kemalists. Neo-Ottomans see these ethnic rifts and threats as things that need to be reconciled. Kemalists, on the other hand, have a harsh view of the potential threat of ethnic Kurds. When both agree on potential threats (even if they only differ in policy and attitude), the policy will be more valid and stronger (Lobell et al., 2009). The ongoing political instability in the Middle East after Erdoğan's ascension to power in Turkey has made it difficult to reconcile relations with Islamic countries with which historically they have not had good relations bilaterally. The instability and many potential threats have made Turkey formulate pragmatic steps in its regional geopolitics (Altunısık, 2020).

This scenario is also what drives Turkey towards Israel. Turkey and Israel both have security interests in the Syrian region. If Turkey has a perceived threat from an ethnic Kurdistan insurgency in the Northern Syria region, Israel has concerns about chemical weapons and Iran's increasingly strong political influence (Ülgül, 2019). As America's only ally in the Middle East, Israel is a logical solution to the regional security problems facing Erdoğan and the AKP Party. Amid the decline in diplomatic relations caused by the position of the conservative Islamist AKP Party, Israel remains a strong security partner for Turkey. Just mention Erdoğan's antagonism towards Israel over the Palestinian issue, especially the Mavi Marmara incident. Shared interests, especially in the
security and economic fields, have become the glue between Turkey and Israel after the diplomatic decline.

**Turkey – Israel Economic Cooperation**

The next indicator that is a determining factor in Turkey's bilateral relations with Israel is the trade and economic relations that exist between these two countries. Erdoğan and the AKP Party's antagonistic stance towards Israel sparked another level of ambivalence, not only in the national security aspect but also in the economic aspect. Although economic cooperation between Turkey and Israel is a variable that is generally connected by diplomatic relations between these two countries, other patterns show ambivalence. Türkiye maintains strong economic ties with Israel. Starting from the rise of the AKP Party to power until Erdoğan became president, trade figures between Turkey and Israel did not show a decline and even tended to increase (Kirisci, 2006; Kirisci & Kaptanoglu, 2011).

The strongest points of economic relations in Turkey's relations with Israel are trade, export-import, and other sectors such as tourism. Turkey's import-export value experienced a steady increase from 2010 to 2015. There were fluctuations in import volume, but in general, the value of the trade surplus increased. Economic opportunities are a strong point of Turkish diplomatic relations with Israel. Several prospects for developing oil and natural gas routes are a driving force for pragmatism in aspects of economic cooperation. Israel needs Turkey to be a politically and economically stable country (at least more stable than its neighboring countries) in supplying and selling its natural products (Alsaftawi, 2016; Volfová, 2014).

Based on the explanation, it can be understood that the economic sector is Turkey's strategy to prevent further deterioration of diplomatic relations after the Mavi Marmara incident because trade and economic relations between Turkey and Israel did not experience a significant decline after the Mavi Marmara incident (Rofii, 2023, Online Interview). Turkey is one of the strategic energy corridors needed in the Middle East and Mediterranean region. Israel is careful in diplomacy with Turkey so that the stability of the energy corridor is maintained, and the European Union can reduce oil and natural gas dependence on Russia. The European Union does not want to take big risks, and neither does Turkey and Israel (Nopens, 2013). The fact that Turkey and Israel are a strategic alliance in the field of energy economics means that this cooperation continues even though the antagonism between Erdoğan and the AKP Party towards Israel has not completely subsided.

**Turkish Domestic Politics**

Domestic factors are one of the factors that play a crucial role in the formulation of a country's foreign policy because changes in foreign policy may be caused by changes in the domestic balance of power and vice versa (Lobell et al., 2009). According to the view of neoclassical realism, domestic-system interaction patterns often occur in various countries. Domestic factors can also play a role in various sectors formulated in a country's foreign policy. This factor is one of the focuses of discussion regarding the analysis of Turkish foreign policy ambivalence during President Erdoğan's leadership in 2014 – 2018.

The Neo-Ottoman view has become a concept inherent in the conservative nuances of the AKP Party and President Erdoğan. The existence of Neo-Ottoman views cannot be separated from the Islamic identity of the AKP party. Some opinions understand that this political view means Turkey is letting go of its attention to Western powers. In contrast, others see this as a balancing step between the proportion of Western powers and Arab countries that Turkey is trying to reach as a regional player (Cohen, 2013).

In its foreign policy formulation, Turkey, through a Neo-Ottoman political perspective, has carried out reforms on democracy and liberalization. Uniquely, according to the Turkish political elite, this restructuring can be implemented with strong party leadership (Davutoğlu, 2012). This restructuring had an impact on foreign policy formulation (Keyman, 2014). The mechanism is quite simple. The AKP
party carried out de-securitization in internal politics in Türkiye. In the formulation of domestic political policies and maneuvers, the AKP Party involves the role of civil political elites to a greater extent. This, if not reducing, at least limiting the role of political elites with military backgrounds who had a dominant role in policy formulation and political decisions before the AKP Party came to power (Ataseven, 2022; Bank & Karadag, 2012).

The implications of the Neo-Ottoman view on foreign policy have their characteristics. The Neo-Ottoman view is an internal balancing process carried out by Turkey in response to its geopolitical poles based on Turkey's desire to become a regional player by balancing its relations with Western countries and with Arab countries by projecting outward-looking political activism and policies (Taspinar, 2008).

The next aspect in domestic politics that shapes the ambivalence of Turkish foreign policy towards Israel is groupthink. Turkey has a structure that represents democratic restructuring in the foreign policy formulation unit. There is a division of power within Turkey's foreign policy formulation units. These units are institutions directly involved in the formulation of Turkey's foreign policy. Erdoğan, as President of Turkey, is the main holder of control and authority in Turkish foreign policy. Meanwhile, there are subordinate institutions that have a role in formulating foreign policy (Aslanargun, 2015).

These institutions provided information, data, and analysis directly to President Erdoğan. There is quite an interesting pattern. This pattern exists among institutional members who act as advisors for the formulation of Turkish foreign policy. Foreign policy is a very limited area, and not all officials or political elites can play a role in it. The influential members in the formulation of Turkey's foreign policy are those close to President Erdoğan. The officials and political elites that Erdoğan chose were based on kinship relationships and personal trust (Neset, 2019).

Based on this observation, a strong bureaucratic pattern can be seen. President Erdoğan has strong control over trusted people in foreign policy circles. This situation makes the premise of group thinking more instrumental in translating external systemic pressures compared to previous bureaucratic patterns.

The process of formulating Turkey's foreign policy can be said to be in a single group unit if we look at the existing patterns in its domestic politics. President Erdoğan does have a strong influence in determining what policies will be implemented (Rofii, 2023, Online Interview). Because policy formulation is carried out collectively with certain people in the policy-making circle and there are no important actors outside the circle of foreign policy formulation who can have a strong influence, it can be said that Turkey has a single group model in formulating its foreign policy (Hermann, 2001). So far, the findings on components of neoclassical realism and groupthink give a clear and proper explanation of the ambivalence of Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel. Such multifaceted analysis uproots the cause and connects many variables into one result.

Conclusion

Turkey faces an anarchic geopolitical situation, where the atmosphere of struggle for power makes Turkey very vigilant in its role as a key player in the Middle East region. The depiction of the power struggle is seen in the Arab Spring phenomenon, which resulted in regime changes and created opportunities for other regional powers, such as Iran, to fill the power vacuum and change the existing status quo. The political situation in the Middle East region is also full of conflict and struggles for power, especially when Turkey is faced with the transnational Kurdistan ethnic insurgency and the chaos resulting from the Syrian Civil War. All these external aspects are considered very carefully by Turkey so that Turkey continues to maintain its strategic relations with Israel on various fronts, including military and economic sectors.

Second, Turkey has a domestic pattern that also influences its foreign policy towards Israel. It is a Neo-Ottoman political view that was initiated based on Turkey's vision of Turkey's glorious past as an important factor in the Middle East region, creating an impetus for Turkey to choose a foreign policy strategy that best supports Turkey's role as a key player in the
Middle East region. Then, the decisions and formulation of Turkey's foreign policy policies are highly centralized with an upright and rigid line of command by President Erdoğan, or what could be called groupthink. In summary, external factors play a more crucial role in determining the outcome of Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel. In contrast, the internal factors give an advantage to policy changes and structural stimulus. Despite President Erdoğan's political antagonism towards Israel, Israel remains a strategic and important bilateral partner for Turkey.

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